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ABSTRACT
Data driven research on Android has gained a great momentum
these years. The abundance of data facilitates knowledge learning,
however, also increases the difficulty of data preprocessing. There-
fore, it is non-trivial to prepare a demanding and accurate set of
data for research. In this study, we put forward AndroVault, a
framework for the Android research composing of data collection,
knowledge representation and knowledge extraction. It has started
with a long-running web crawler for data collection (both apps
and description) since 2013, which guarantees the timeliness of
data; With static analysis and dynamic analysis of the collected
data, we compute a variety of attributes to characterize Android
apps. After that, we employ a knowledge graph to connect all these
apps by computing their correlation in terms of attributes; Last, we
leverage multiple technologies such as logical inference, machine
learning, and correlation analysis to extract facts that are benefi-
cial for specific research problems. Based on the produced data of
high quality, we have successfully conducted many research works
including malware detection, malware spread, and Android testing.
We would like to release our data to the research community in an
authenticated manner, and encourage them to conduct productive
research.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Android becomes the biggest mobile platform since 2010. To date,
Android further consolidates its domination in the mobile world
with reaching the largest market share of 86.8% [16]. An enormous
number of Android applications (referred as to “apps” hereinafter)
provide a great convenience to Android users to conduct network
life like financial management, online shopping, online eduction,
entertainment, etc. These apps help to construct a huge Android
ecosystem in which everyone can complete their online activities.
In the past years, Android has gained a remarkable attraction
from researchers of both academia and industry. There are five
popular research directions on Android: malware detection [2, 3,
17, 23, 25, 28, 34, 35, 39], app testing [10, 22, 26, 33], clone detec-
tion [7, 11, 37], advertisement analysis [5, 9, 20, 30], and perfor-
mance analysis [13–15, 21]. All of these studies rely on a massive
number of apps for analysis, and to some extent, the qualify of
data. Android apps of a larger number may be more representative
and informative, and thereby more approximate to the matters in
the real world. However, one fine-grained data set is desired to
conduct a comprehensive study on specific research problems such
as malware detection.
Along with the drastic increase of data and computing power,
the research on Android has migrated from methodology driven to
data driven that depends on the quality and scale of data to a large
extent [32]. There are emerging a variety of data driven research
works which learn knowledge from a large scale of data, and then
complete specific research tasks based on the knowledge [5, 8, 19].
Apparently, the quality of data is important to the data driven
research since it determines the quality of extracted knowledge.
According to [4, 31], the quality of data is mainly referred to as
the completeness, consistency, timeliness and accuracy of data for
a specific purpose. However, many research works are still using
outdated data such as MalGenome [41] to learn malware features,
or using insufficient data that may produce inaccurate results. In
order to provide ample data of high quality for Android research, we
have been dedicated to a continuous effort to collect Android apps
and their descriptive information from a wide variety of sources.
To fulfil a specific research task on the data of an enormous vol-
ume, researchers have to perform data preprocessing, for instance,
data cleaning, clustering and filtering. However, the volume of data
can raise the difficulty of data preprocessing, and consequently
knowledge learning. AndroZoo [1] provides the largest number of
Android apps for the community. However, it is extremely arduous
and frustrating to select the data of the most interest for research.
To tackle this problem, we compute 36 attributes (see Section 3.2
for detail) to characterize apps, and construct a comprehensive
knowledge graph by establishing connections between all Android
apps in terms of these attributes as detailed in Section 3.3. Given a
variety of relationships between entities in the knowledge graph, it
becomes much easier yet faster to extract data of common interest
from millions of apps.
To further expedite research works, we incorporate some tech-
nologies inKnowledge Vault [12] to obtainmoremature and abstract
data, a.k.a, facts from the graph. Analogy to Knowledge Vault fus-
ing structured facts in Knowledge Graph [29] with learned facts by
supervisor machine learning, AndroVault has extract 3 types of
facts that could be directly used for research. In this study, facts are
more abstract and composite properties that are put on one or more
apps. For example, we define a fact that the apps with same package
name and version code but different signing certificates are likely
piggybacked. Hence, we can obtain a relatively small but more
accurate data set for the app piggybacking study (More details are
referred to in Section 3.4). As a consequence, it can greatly reduce
the effort to select and process apps from the massive number of
apps.
To date,AndroVault has powered up several research studies in-
cluding malware detection [25, 27, 28], malware generation [24, 40],
Android app testing [33], malware spread study, vulnerability detec-
tion, and auto GUI code generation. Fortunately, it is a growing and
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extendable data warehouse: AndroVault is continuously collect-
ing more apps and meta data from the Web; its knowledge graph
can be extended by computing new attributes, and building new
relationships between entities; more sophisticated computations
can be conducted to extract required facts.
Contributions.We make the following contributions.
• Vigorous and continuous endeavors in collecting and processing
Android apps. The AndroVault work dates back to 2013,
and ranges in the period of Android’s rapid advance. So far,
AndroVault has collected more than 5million Android apps
from 33 different sources. These apps and processed data
occupy a storage of over 50T, and acquire around 3,472 days
in total to process (assuming it takes 1 min to process one
app).
• A novel knowledge representation for millions of Android apps.
We make the first attempt to employ a knowledge graph to
represent millions of apps and their relationships in between.
The apps are computed pairwise and connected based on the
similar or identical attributes. The knowledge graph provides
an illustrative presentation to show the correlations between
apps, and facilitates the extraction of useful facts for research.
• AndroVault’s practicality in powering up the Android re-
search. AndroVault has prepared accurate and abundant
data for several research works including malware detection,
malware propagation, and app testing. The data of high qual-
ity cannot only save researchers’ time of data collection, but
also facilitate better experiment results.
2 THE ANDROVAULT APPROACH
AndroVault proceeds in four steps as shown in Figure 1. It takes
Android app markets including Google Play as input, and pro-
duces a knowledge graph combing millions of entities including
apps. Moreover, AndroVault employs multiple technologies to
produce facts that can facilitate the Android research. For ease of
use, AndroVault provides a computation and clustering engine
for researchers which can produce a set of apps of researchers’
high interest as well as the corresponding meta information. In
particular, we describe each step as follows:
• App crawling. AndroVault downloads apps from the offi-
cial market Google Play and 27 third-party markets. Besides
apk files, we also download their additional information
for example app description, number of installation, review
score, and category. In addition, we have also collected a
large number of apps from publicly known app reposito-
ries including MalGenome [41], Drebin [2], VirusShare1,
AMD [38] and AndroZoo [1].
• Attribute computation. Attributes are a condensed and
abstract representation, which describes the characteristics
of Android apps. There are basically 36 types of attributes
produced by AndroVault as elaborated in Section 3.2. At-
tributes are a bridge to connect or cluster apps with each
other.With the computed attributes, researchers can perform
machine learning to classify malware, or compute functional
similarity. For example, some attributes (e.g., permissions,
1http://virusshare.com
invoked APIs) can be regarded as feature and passed to a
classification algorithm to detect malware.
• Graph construction. Android apps lie in the dataset inde-
pendently, which may cause inconvenience in a large-scale
analysis of app. This step is to eliminate the information iso-
lated island of app, and establish connection between apps
and relevant data. Inspired by technologies of knowledge
representation, we propose two types of relationships be-
tween apps, i.e., probabilistic relationship and deterministic
relationship. These relationships act on attributes and serve
as a property for them (referred to Section 3.3 for detail).
Eventually, we construct a huge knowledge graph for the
entire set of apps, in which nodes are either individual apps
with associated attributes or other data (e.g., app author),
and edges are connections between these knowledge nodes
with respect to a certain relationship. The statistics of the
graph is elaborated in Section 4.1.
• Fact extraction. Facts are high-order and composite proper-
ties associated with one individual or a set of apps. Generally,
facts assist in certain research tasks by providing a prepared
data set as well as auxiliary information. They are derived
from the built graph, and produced by a variety of tech-
nologies such as machine learning, deep learning, logical
inference, and statistical computation. For example, repre-
sentative features for each malware family can be extracted
by feature selection technology. These features as signature
could be used to classify malware. AndroVault has com-
puted 3 types of facts that are beneficial for several research
studies.
So far, we construct a knowledge graph and 3 types of facts based
on it. These knowledge, together with a knowledge query system,
provide researchers with ample and precise data as described below.
Application scenarios. The upper layer in Figure 1 shows how
researchers utilize the constructed knowledge graph as well as
associated facts, and then conduct their research. In particular,
researchers query apps or certain facts from AndroVault, and
AndroVault can produce a list of corresponding apps as well as
their attributes by traversing the knowledge graph. Based on these
information, researchers can continue with their research such as
code smell identification, malware spread, and plagiarism detection.
For example, one security analyst wants to identify and then analyze
the piggybacked apps, he or she can query the query facts in which
apps are of high similarity in code, or have same package name and
version code but are signed with different certificates. AndroVault
can produce a set of more representative apps, and thereby facilitate
the analyst’s research. In another scenario, one deep learning expert
intends to study the evolution of code style for one developer, and
he or she can query the apps developed by this developer. Based
on the selected apps by AndroVault, this expert is able to quickly
employ his/her deep learning algorithm to identify the evolutionary
patterns of code, or detect plagiarism with the trained model.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present the methodologies for each step, and
elaborate the output results accordingly.
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Figure 1: The workflow of AndroVault
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Figure 2: A simplified knowledge graph of AndroVault
3.1 App Crawling
The input for app crawling is a list of Android markets, and An-
droVault contains a web crawler to download apk files period-
ically. The crawler performs a vertical search limiting its search
space within target markets. The crawler is built on top of Scrapy
and GooglePlayDownloader for the 27 third-party markets and
Google Play, respectively.
AndroVault has collected two kinds of information with the
crawler: apk files and descriptive information. Apk files are An-
droid Package Kit, which is a package format for distribution and
installation in Android. AndroVault has totally collected 5,005,669
apk files from 33 different sources. Descriptive information are
information that describe the detailed information of apps in our
knowledge such as app description, download times, version code,
and scores. AndroVault has totally collected 16 types of descrip-
tive information from Google Play.
3.2 Attribute Computing
Attributes are representative features that characterize apps. In
order to establish the connections between apps, AndroVault
computes 36 attributes in total from four aspects as described below.
Manifest file. We extract the following 11 attributes from the
manifest file of app. The attributes in Manifest contain compo-
nents including activities, services, broadcast receivers and content
providers, declared permissions, request permissions, libraries, app
name, package name, version code, version name, max sdk, min sdk,
and target sdk.
Dex file. We perform a lightweight static analysis on app and
extract the following 7 attributes: sha256 that provides an almost-
unique, fixed size 256-bit cryptographic hash for app, certificate
with which apps are digitally signed; compilation date denoting the
creation date; invoked Android APIs in app; strings, which are con-
tained in app; “centroids” [7] for each method in app, and; invoked
apps with which the app interacts.
Security report. We fetch detection results for each app fromVirus-
Total, in which there are malware information detected by 57
antivirus tools. In addition, we employ AVClass to normalize fam-
ily labels for detected malware. The security report contributes 2
attributes for computing.
Crawl information. During the crawling process, we also crawl
the following 16 types of information as attribute: category, de-
scription, screenshots, reviews, scores, what’s news, updated date, file
size, install number, version, required Android version, price, content
rating, developer, similar apps, and market.
In particular, attributes are of either a primary or composite type.
For example, “package name” and “app name” are of type string,
while “request permissions” and “detection results” are of composite
type which contain a set of elements. In order to compute attributes
from dex file, we implement a lightweight static analyzer to perform
a pattern matching in code for attributes “invoked Android APIs”,
and “strings”. The attribute “invoked apps” can be extracted by
identifying the outgoing Intents in code.
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3.3 Graph Construction
AndroVault provides a graph-based knowledge representation for
the collected and computed attributes. The knowledge graph is a
three tuple, in particular, G = (V ,E,R).
• V is the set of knowledge entities on Android. In addition,
V ∈ {APP ,MARKET , FAMILY ,AUTHOR,
LIBRARY ,CATEGORY }, in which one entity could be an
app (identified by sha256), an app market (e.g., Anzhi), a
malware family (e.g., DroidKungFu), an app author (e.g.,
WhatsApp Inc.), a third-party library (e.g., AdMob), or an
app category (e.g., Social).
• R is the set of relationships which are used to describe the
correlation between knowledge entities. There are two types
of relationships—deterministic relationship (Rd ) and proba-
bilistic relationship (Rs ), i.e., R ∈ {Rd ,Rs }. In particular, a
deterministic relationship defines a certain connection be-
tween two entities, while a probabilistic relationship describe
a connection between two entities which is probabilistic
ranging in (0, 1). For instance, the deterministic relationship
“author” denotes that one knowledge entity is created by
another, and (code_sim, 0.8) means that one knowledge en-
tity is code similar to another with 80% probability. More
relationships are presented in Table 3.
• E : V × V → R, which is the set of edges that link two enti-
ties by a specific relationship. As shown in Figure 2, the app
Gmail is created by the developer GooдleLLC . Hence, there
is one link between the entities Gamil and GooдleLLC , i.e.,
(Gmail ,GooдleLLC) → (author ). The malware app1025197
has similar code with the malware app1002575, so there is a
probabilistic relationship in between as (app1025197,app1002575) → (code_sim, 0.9).
Figure 2 shows a simplified knowledge graph combining all types
of knowledge entities and a partial set of relationships. In detail,
we can easily draw some conclusions from this graph. For example,
the apps Google+ and WhatsApp belong to the same category; the
two apps with different hash values (c963...bcca, e9e1...50d1) are
all WhatsApp but of different versions; two apps app1025197 and
app1002571 created by one author are similar (0.9) in code to each
other; and the app “Download All Files” has invoked the app “Gmail”
by sending it an Intent.
To construct a knowledge graph for Android is to compute all
relationships listed in Table 3. The deterministic relationships are
established with the identical attributes of apps. The probabilis-
tic relationships are computed by employing different similarity
metrics between apps or markets as follows.
Jacaard Index. We employ Jacaard Index to compute the similarity
of the composite attributes that exhibit a set of elements without
any particular order. As shown in Figure 3, four types of composite
attributes of apps contain a set of strings, and are compared with
the Jacaard Index.
3D-CFG Similarity. To compute code similarity between apps, we
employ the approach in [7, 25] to first compute the centroid for
each Java method, compute the distance between methods pairwise,
and eventually obtain the distance between apps.
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Contained files Libraries
Figure 3: Composite attributes onwhich Jacaard is employed
To better depict the proximity between knowledge entities and
reduce the size of the knowledge graph, we only retain the proba-
bilistic relationships with a probability above 0.9. More results are
presented in Section 4.1.
3.4 Fact Extraction
Facts are high-order and composite properties associated with one
individual or a set of apps. Generally, facts support a certain re-
search study by providing either a prepared data set and associated
attributes. Many technologies can be applied to extract facts such as
machine learning, statistical inference, and graph-based searching.
In particular, we present 3 types of facts produced by AndroVault
produces as follows to support different research studies. It is wor-
thy mentioning that AndroVault can be extended to extract more
types of facts to aid in other research problems.
Malicious Code Localization. Generally, malware samples in the
same family share common malicious behavior. In such a case,
AndroVault performs a clustering algorithm to identify methods
that are representative for this family. These methods are where
malicious code is located, and could be represented as signature for
malware detection. The fact has powered up two projects [25, 27].
Market Correlation. Apps are commonly copied between mar-
kets. It is necessary to learn the copy mechanism for the study
of malware spread between markets. AndroVault computes the
replication ratio for each market, and identify the commonality
between markets. The result has powered up one study of malware
spread between app markets.
Suspicious App Identification. An update attack is conducted
by one author adding malicious code in his/her old-fashioned apps.
AndroVault identifies these suspicious apps by searching the
knowledge graphwith three attributes (i.e., package name, detection
result, and certificate) of app. A piggybacked app is created by
another author modifying codes in the original app. AndroVault
identifies piggybacked apps by searching the knowledge graph with
three attributes (i.e., package name, version code, and certificate).
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Figure 4: System architecture for the AndroVault service
4 TOOL IMPLEMENTATION & RESULTS
AndroVault is implemented with 8K lines of Java and 15K lines
of Python. In addition, it employs several state-of-the-art tools to
achieve specific tasks: Scrapy2 and GoogleplayDownloader3
contribute the implementation of our crawler to download Android
apps from Google Play and third-party markets; AndroGuard and
Soot [36] are used to perform a static analysis on app; AVClass
is used to standardize the name of malware families; and scikit-
learn4 is used to perform machine learning tasks to extract new
knowledge.
For ease of use, we build a web service to manage AndroVault
and visualize the knowledge as shown in Figure 4. The web ser-
vice is based on Django5 which responds the requests from the
administrator and researchers in need. The knowledge produced by
AndroVault is stored inMongoDB, a NoSQL database. Benefitting
from the handy and various functions provided by this web service,
the administrator can manage the AndroVault engine with its
substantial functions of data collection, knowledge representation
and fact extraction. Android researchers are able to query knowl-
edge, and obtain their requisite data and knowledge to accomplish
their goals. Figure 7, a screenshot of the web service, illustrates the
GUI to visualize the knowledge graph.
4.1 Statistics of Knowledge Graph
In this section, we present the statistics of collected and produced
data by AndroVault.
Collected Data. Since 2013, we have crawled Android apps and
other unstructured data from the Internet for four years.AndroVault
integrates 28 crawlers to download apps from corresponding mar-
kets, and one additional crawler to download app description from
Google Play. To date, we have collected 5,005,669 Android apps,
and 1,180,141 entries of app description.
We present all markets and the statistics of collected data in
Table 4. In addition, we download 2,759,053 apps from four well-
known app repositories:MalGenome, Drebin, VirusShare, and
AndroZoo. According to VirusTotal’s detection results, we de-
termine one app to being malware by the confirmation of at least
one antivirus tool. In Figure 5, we plot the distributions of apps and
malware over time and Android versions.
2https://scrapy.org/
3https://framagit.org/tuxicoman/googleplaydownloader
4http://scikit-learn.org/stable/
5https://www.djangoproject.com/
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Figure 5: Statistics of collected apps andmalware. The x-axis
of the left figure is the years since the malware is created,
and the y-axis denotes the number of apps andmalware. The
x-axis of the right figure is the Android versions from API
1 to API 24, and the y-axis denotes the number of apps and
malware. The blue bar denotes the number of apps, and the
red bar denotes the number of malware.
Table 1: Top 10 families with the most number of malware
Family Number Malicious Behaviors
kuguo 25,002 privacy (e.g., location), display ads, install apps
airpush 17,135 privacy (e.g., IMEI), create shortcut or bookmarks
dowgin 16,818 privacy (e.g., IMEI), display ads, exec. payloads
smsreg 10,737 privacy (e.g., location, IMEI, network operator)
secapk 9,885 code is protected by an app shield
gappusin 9,452 download payloads, display ads, install shortcut
revmob 8,731 privacy (e.g., account, IMEI), display ads
leadbolt 6,636 change settings, display ads
youmi 5,919 privacy (e.g., IMEI), display ads, install apps
domob 5,718 privacy (e.g., IMEI), display ads, install apps
Graph Presentation. We present the statistics for the entities
market, family, author, and category in the knowledge graph. Table 4
displays the description for the 28 app markets including location,
language, hosted country, number of apps, and number of malware.
AndroVault obtains 1,004,550 malware samples by virtue of
VirusTotal, and further classifies 200,373 of them into 1,400 fami-
lies using AVClass. As shown in Table 1, we present ten families
with the most number of malware, as well as the contained mali-
cious behaviors.
Apps have to be digitally signed before release with a specific cer-
tificate. Therefore, the certificate of apps can be used to recognize
different authors. AndroVault extracts the information of certifi-
cate for all apps, including the public key, the detailed information
of issuer, and the detailed information of subject. We present the
distribution of authors of identified malware in Table 2. The first
column refers to the authors which produce malware in a range
of number. For example, “1-10” denote the number of the authors’
malware we can find in the dataset is in the range from 1 to 10;
the second column refers to the percentage of the authors over all
malware authors, and; the third column refers to the percentage of
the malware written by these authors over all malware samples.
Apps are labeled with a unique category in Google Play for
a brief description. AndroVault incorporates 41 categories, and
classifies 2,759,053 apps into these categories. Figure 6 shows the
distribution of apps in terms of category.
Extracted Facts. AndroVault has extracted a number of facts
that could power some research studies. In a nutshell, AndroVault
computes all shared apps between markets, and finds that market
5
Table 2: The distribution of authorship of Androidmalware.
# Range Author Total Malware# % # %
1-10 223,702 (96.2%) 374,296 (39.1%)
11-100 8,116 (3.5%) 211,169 (22.0%)
101-500 600 (0.3%) 114,141 (11.9%)
501-1000 52 (–%) 35,208 (3.7%)
>1000 65 (–%) 222,874 (23.3%)
Figure 6: App distribution in categories
F-Droid has the maximal portion (92.4%) of replicated apps, and
market AppFun has the minimal portion (1.0%) of replicated apps.
The detailed data of sharing between markets are beneficial for the
study of app spread between markets.
AndroVault identifies 27,560 apps by their package names
(71,888 apps in total). Each app has 2.61 versions on average. More-
over, we find that 10,348 (14.4%) of them become malware during
the upgrade process, and 21,037 (29.3%) of them are modified by
another author which are likely piggybacked apps. The facts could
be further utilized for app corruption analysis (why apps become
malicious during upgrade), and feature extraction for piggybacked
apps.
AndroVault employs 3D-CFG similarity to identify cloned code
for 149 malware families in Drebin. The cloned code can be used as
signature to give a find-grained representation for each family. In
total, 7,312 methods are extracted, and each family has 49 methods
that represent malicious behaviors on average.
4.2 Use Cases
The collected data and extracted knowledge have driven a variety
of substantial studies. In this section, we elaborate three of them to
demonstrate the efficiency and practicability of AndroVault.
Malware Detection. Machine learning is commonly used to de-
tect malware, and an accurate, representative, and updated data
set of Android apps and malware is very significant to detection
performance. AndroVault provides 44,347 benign apps and 42,910
malware in a span of 224 days for [27]. In addition to the selected
malware over time, AndroVault also provides several attributes
of them such as requested permissions. Based on the data, the
Figure 7: A screenshot for the visualization system
study is superior in detecting evolving malware that exploits new
vulnerabilities or attack technologies.
Malware Propagation. Malware propagation between markets
on Android has not been thoroughly studied before. One of the rea-
sons is that the detailed data depicting the propagation of malware
within or between markets is absent for researchers. AndroVault
supports this study (i.e., malware spread between markets) by pro-
viding the distributions of malware within markets, and detailed
family labels of these malware samples. Based on the prepared data,
this study can identify the growth model within markets, and the
spread model between markets. Further, it can facilitate the studies
of assessing the security of markets, and identifying the infection
capability of malware.
Android App Testing. AndroVault can benefit Android app test-
ing from two aspects: providing entry points for apps that could
trigger the behaviors inside the apps. For example, one app may
execute specific actions once received a broadcast message. In such
a case, this app has to register a broadcast receiver to listen to
this message, either in the manifest file, or in code. AndroVault
elaborates the apps to test with these entry points which can be
employed by a tester to increase the test coverage; selecting a rep-
resentative data set for testing in terms of multiple dimensions
including popularity, category, and compatibility.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we present the applicable areas of AndroVault,
and the future work.
5.1 Application
Since AndroVault is able to provide a more accurate data set
according to researchers’ requirements, there are many potential
applicable areas where AndroVault can benefit. In the following,
we detail its four applicable areas with answering howAndroVault
aids in them.
Feature Evaluation. Feature selection is an important yet chal-
lenging task inmachine learning. The quality of features determines
the performance of machine learning approaches to a large extent.
Good features are supposed to be concise, representative, and non-
overfitting, which require extensive experiments to evaluate. This
6
problem also perplexes Android researchers since they are using
a large number of machine learning techniques to solve issues on
Android, such as malware detection, third party library detection,
family labelling, and app recommendation. Given by AndroVault
36 types of features for data on Android, it allows researchers to
conduct an immediate experiment to evaluate the features for dif-
ferent research goals. In addition, feature selection algorithms can
also be performed on these well prepared features, and identify
most suitable features for a specific research task.
Trend Analysis. It has become a hot topic of trend analysis in the
Android field, for example, howmalware evolves during the endless
war against security defenders, and how code is refactored to im-
prove its security, performance, modularity, and readability during
its sustainable upgrade process. AndroVault records and main-
tains abundant attributes for apps to facilitate this kind of research.
Therefore, one clustering algorithm can be immediately used to
extract a set of data of the most interest. If, for example, researchers
are working on a study of malware evolution, they can utilize An-
droVault to produce a list of malware samples that belong to a
same family while share different characteristics (e.g., requested
permission, invoked APIs and dependent libraries) according to
specific requirements. This can spare researchers’ time to collect
and purify related data, which may not the main contributions in
their research.
Risk Assessment. It is well known that we can assess the risk
of apps by checking whether it contains unwanted or malicious
behaviors. Fortunately, researchers can accomplish a more compre-
hensive assessment with the help of AndroVault. As we know, it
has been commonly applied in assessing the risk or trustworthiness
of one node by the opinions of its neighbors in reputation system. In
a similar way, we can build a reputation system on the constructed
knowledge graph by AndroVault. In the constructed knowledge
graph, researchers can choose suitable rating data from all present
relationships between apps. Based on the rating data, they manage
to compute a quantitative value for risk. The relationships, such as
the shared third party libraries, similar reviews given by users, and
the common developers , are all potentially useful to assess the risk
of apps.
Collusive Attacks. Collusive attacks mean one kind of attacks
that are completed by two or more involved apps, which are widely
occurring on Android [6]. However, it is a time-consuming task
to identify the collaborative apps in an enormous number of apps
pairwise. Since the Intent via Binder is the most prominent method
for inter-application communication, AndroVault employs a light-
weight static analysis to identify possible communication behaviors
existing in code, and builds a connection between these apps in
communication. Therefore, researchers can leverage this data to
perform amore accurate analysis of the communication, and further
confirm whether one collusive attack occurs.
5.2 Future work
There are still some promising research directions of this work. We
are going to incorporate code feature with natural language descrip-
tion, and build a correlation in between. For example, one app may
claim in its description that it does not read a file in the external
storage, however, it breaks the vow and stealthily access sensitive
files. This provides a strong clue that the app may be conducting
malicious behaviors stealthily. Therefore, the fidelity information
(i.e., what it behaves is what is described (WIBIWID)) can benefit
several researches such as malware detection, consistency checking,
and code profiling.
Execution trace of apps can exactly reveal their behaviors dur-
ing execution. Some apps may behave differently on real devices
and virtual machines in order to avoid the security inspection by
analysts. Other apps may exploit exposed vulnerabilities to escape
the Android Sandbox and gain privileged permissions. In such sce-
narios, it is desirable to collect dynamic execution traces of apps
and perform an in-depth analysis on them. Due to the time cost of
dynamic testing (e.g., one app costs three hours for testing), we are
unable to collect many dynamic execution traces currently. We in-
tend to continue this collection work and produce more knowledge
on the data.
AndroVault are also dedicated to tackling vulnerability issues
on Android. A large proportion of exploits are implemented in
native code, andmoreover, there are a massive volume of web-based
resources profiling these vulnerabilities like National Vulnerability
Database (https://nvd.nist.gov/). In the future, we intend to collect
these web-based resources, and compute attributes of native code
in apps. The resulting knowledge can facilitate the detection of
vulnerabilities and exploits.
6 RELATEDWORK
MalGenome [41] is an initiative study to dissect Android malware
and its evolution. It provides a considerate number (1,260) of mal-
ware samples to the public with detailed malicious behaviors inside.
Subsequently, Drebin [2] aggregate 5,560 malware samples which
are identified and classified by a machine learning method. These
samples are categorized into 149 families in terms of contained
malicious behaviors.
Wei et al. leverage the detection results from VirusTotal and
similarity computation to produce find-grained labels for Android
malware [38]. Furthermore, they conduct an in-depth manual anal-
ysis to present the detailed malicious behaviors inside the malware.
The final dataset AMD currently contains 24,553 samples, catego-
rized in 135 varieties among 71 malware families.
AndroZoo [1] and its extension AndroZoo++ [18] have col-
lected over five million Android apps from diverse sources includ-
ing Google Play to date. In addition, they figure out 20 types of
app metadata to share with the research community for relevant
research works.
Further to their work, we build a huge knowledge graph based
on these attributes by machine learning or statistical inferring
correlation between apps. Therefore, we are able to extract some
primary knowledge that are extracting from the knowledge graph.
In addition, other graph-based approaches are also be employed to
produce knowledge in research.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose AndroVault to collect, represent, and
abstract knowledge for automated computing. AndroVault can
produce a demanding and accurate data for a specific research task
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by computing the characteristics of Android apps as well as corre-
lations in between. Based on the data produced by AndroVault,
we have conducted a variety of research works including malware
detection, code generation, and Android testing.
AndroVault is a continuous work, and will be further extended
and enhanced with more convenient functions for researchers. For
example, we are going to compute more attributes of Android apps
related to vulnerabilities, to facilitate the detection of vulnerabilities,
and automated exploit generation.
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Table 3: All relationships between knowledge nodes
Type Relationship Description
Deterministic
Relationship
malware the relationship between one app and one malware family denotes the app belongs to this family.
author the relationship between one app and one author denotes the app is created by this author.
library the relationship between one app and one library denotes the app contains this library.
market this relationship between one app and one app market denotes the app is from this market.
category this relationship between one app and category denotes the app is classified into this category.
upgrade this relationship between two apps denotes they are of same app but different version.
invoke this relationship between two apps denoting that one app invokes the another.
Probabilistic
Relationship
code_sim this relationship between two apps denotes their similarity in code.
api_sim this relationship between two apps denotes their similarity in invoked APIs.
perm_sim this relationship between two apps denotes their similarity in permission.
comp_sim this relationship between two apps denotes their similarity in components.
lib_sim this relationship between two apps denotes their similarity in requested hardware features.
file_sim this relationship between two apps denotes their similarity in contained files.
mark_sim this relationship between two markets denotes their commonality in apps.
Table 4: The description of the 28 app markets of our crawled apps
Name URL Language Country # apps # malware
googleplay https://play.google.com/store?hl=en English Global 1,252,681 84,779
qq http://sj.qq.com/myapp/ Chinese China 303,372 85,546
anzhi http://anzhi.com/ Chinese China 256,495 59,570
getjar http://www.getjar.com/ English Europe 140,528 22,535
mumayi http://www.mumayi.com/ Chinese China 45,399 21,219
xiaomi http://app.mi.com/ Chinese China 36,453 20,868
apk20 http://www.apk20.com/ English US 33,555 5,260
hiapk http://www.hiapk.com/ Chinese China 29,291 11,555
eoemarket http://www.eoemarket.com/ Chinese China 27,012 12,257
appchina http://www.appchina.com/ Chinese China 14,769 8,858
baidu http://shouji.baidu.com/ Chinese China 13,909 425
coolapk http://coolapk.com Chinese China 13,851 2,754
apkmirror http://www.apkmirror.com/ English US 11,641 404
flyme http://app.flyme.cn/ Chinese China 11,278 4,512
gfan http://apk.gfan.com/ Chinese China 10,746 5,533
cnmo http://app.cnmo.com/ Chinese China 10,745 3,831
androiddrawer http://www.androiddrawer.com/ English Global 9,106 747
wangyi http://m.163.com/android/index.html Chinese China 7,054 3,447
anruan http://www.anruan.com/ Chinese China 6,781 3,233
slideme http://slideme.org English US 4,711 209
fdroid https://f-droid.org/ English US 3,757 64
freewarelovers http://www.freewarelovers.com/android English/German Germany 3,595 248
mob http://mob.org/ English US 2,914 567
wandoujia http://www.wandoujia.com/apps Chinese China 2,888 1,641
apkpure https://apkpure.com English US 2,827 435
appsapk http://appsapk.com English US 1,997 196
huawei http://appstore.huawei.com/ Chinese China 1,771 0
chinamobile http://mm.10086.cn/ Chinese China 236 131
Total 2,246,616 360,824
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